Assessing Trump’s First 50 Days
Geopolitical risk expert Ian Bremmer on how the world is navigating the White House’s rapid early moves.
By Ravi Agrawal, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy.
It’s common for pundits and commentators to analyze a new leader’s first 100 days in office. But with U.S. President Donald Trump making several rapid fire moves early on in his second term, it’s worth assessing his first 50 days in the White House and the impact his policies are having on the world.
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On the latest episode of FP Live, I spoke with geopolitical risk expert Ian Bremmer, the founder and president of Eurasia Group, about Trump’s major moves so far. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or listen to the FP Live podcast. What follows is a condensed and lightly edited transcript of our discussion.
Ravi Agrawal: So, Ian, 50 days in, are we beginning to see the contours of a Trump foreign-policy doctrine?
Ian Bremmer: Doctrine is too strong; it implies a level of consistent long-term strategy that I don’t believe Trump has. But we have a good sense of what Trump wants to see. He is, of course, in a much stronger position this time around than he was in his first term. He’s consolidated much more power around him. He has loyalists in the cabinet that will not give him bad news and will implement his wishes, his policies, and his whims. Some of those people are very good, and some are not very capable, but all are loyal. And that’s played out over the first 50 days.
A lot of other countries have responded with “get out of the guy’s way and let’s not fight with them.” That is particularly true if these are weak characters. What we’re seeing is that Trump is transactional when he’s dealing with someone he believes is a powerful interlocutor. But when he’s dealing with someone weaker, he’s predatory. That’s not a win-win. That’s an, “I win. I set the rules. You do exactly what I want or there will be hell to pay.” And that’s how he feels about the Canadians and the Mexicans. It’s certainly the way he feels about the Ukrainians. We have a good sense of where that’s working and where it isn’t, where it’s causing permanent long-term disruption and where it isn’t, and also who the winners are in the first 50 days.
The reason that 50 days is more appropriate than 100 is because Trump himself recognizes that he does not have a lot of time. He’s not running again. He is 78 years old. He was shot in the head a few months ago and almost killed. For lots of reasons, when he talks to his friends, he talks about the fact that he needs to get this stuff done now. There is a level of urgency and a willingness to tolerate broken china as a consequence, whether it’s a relationship or a market reaction that he would have been more cautious about in his first term.
RA: What has surprised you most in these first 50 days?
IB: Elon Musk. The fact that he has largely given up the day-to-day running of his many large corporations to be the principal driver and activator of Trump’s policy. We knew he’d have influence and that he would work to enrich himself on the back of having spent $250 million picking a winner. But I’m surprised that he has played the principal role in driving disruption inside the Trump administration. It’s had a pretty significant impact because Trump has always been willing to talk about policy in any space at any given moment, irrespective of how well it’s thought out. He’s quite masterful in terms of his political instincts, and he has virtually no filter. But with Elon, he has someone that is willing and capable to implement those things. And, yes, that has alienated and antagonized some in the inner circle around Trump, but no one’s as inner circle as Elon. That’s been the singular surprise for me.
RA: On foreign policy, you said there are clear winners and losers. Who are the winners? Who are the losers? And, also, do you think that’s going to stay that way over the next couple of years?
IB: I think in the near term, Trump is going to get a lot of wins because so few countries are willing to fight him. You see that already with Mexico and Panama. BlackRock is buying those two ports from Hong Kong Chinese control. That’s an obvious win for Trump. [Former President Joe] Biden didn’t get that done. In the Middle East, we got a Gaza cease-fire and a Hezbollah cease-fire, with [Steve] Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy, heavily involved even when Biden was still president. That was meaningful, and I don’t think would have happened under a Kamala Harris presidency. So he’s getting a lot of early wins, but there are going to be significant long-term implications for countries around the world that don’t feel like they can count on the United States.
On your question about winners and losers: The winners are those countries that are capable of navigating this long term, countries that actually have good relations with Trump and feel like he’s beneficial to them. The Gulf states, in particular—Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and also Israel. I’d also put India in that camp as a country that—even though they are getting tariffs from Trump—is seen as with him because of the strong right-wing populism with [Indian Prime Minister Narendra] Modi. Trump finds that valuable. And both have their antagonisms with China. Smaller folks like [Prime Minister] Viktor Orban in Hungary, [President] Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and [President Javier Milei in Argentina are all winners in this environment. China’s a winner because it can take advantage of the fact that the Americans are withdrawing from multilateral and global architecture. If the Americans aren’t trusted by the Europeans, the Europeans will hedge more with the Chinese. If the global south is antagonized by the United States, China will be increasing its role with both economic and diplomatic capabilities more aligned with it. If the Americans shut down 87 percent of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Belt and Road’s the only thing happening across the global south. So, China’s taking hits from the Americans in the bilateral relationship, but long term I certainly see China as a winner. And for now, Russia is a winner. Trump is engaging with [Russian President] Vladimir Putin directly, and he’s not asking for much so far, and he’s giving Russia opportunities over the Ukrainians, who are in a much weaker position. Their unwillingness to play ball, just as Trump demands it, will have massive consequences for them, whereas for Putin that’s not yet as clear.
RA: And to finish that train of thought, the losers would be European countries plus any countries that have relied on U.S. alliances or a rules-based international order. What is your sense of where Europe goes from here? We’ve heard so much talk now about them trying to reorient their defense industrial base, but that will take years.
IB: Europe’s in the worst position here because, in addition to being hit by Trump on tariffs, it’s also being hit on Ukraine. Trump is going over their heads to engage a rapprochement with Europe’s principal enemy, Russia. Also, Trump is going after Europe’s core values and saying, “We don’t think that you guys are really democracies. We don’t think you support rule of law and freedom of speech. We do. And we actually want the anti-European Union folks to win, like the AfD [in Germany], like the Reform Party in the United Kingdom, and like Orban in Hungary.” That’s clearly existential for the Europeans. If you look at everything Trump has accomplished on the global stage in his first 50 days, the most consequential has been a decisive break that he has created with the Europeans. I think he’s done that intentionally because he believes that Europe is one electoral cycle behind the United States in voting MAGA types into office in Germany, France, the U.K., and across the EU with the Patriot Front.
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Now, what can the Europeans do? So far, they’re doing a lot. That is particularly true with Germany’s decision to exclude defense spending from the debt break, which essentially allows Germany to unlock a very low debt-to-GDP ratio and spend it to become a military power. That’s an enormous change in direction from Europe’s largest economy. It is leading to other similar actions across Europe. Now, are they able to do it quickly enough to make a meaningful difference for the Ukrainians? The answer is only if Trump says, “Aha! The Europeans are now taking the lead. Look at the genius. I got them to do that. Biden never could have. Harris never could have. So now, I’m willing to backstop.” If he does that, then I think Ukraine actually has a chance. If he doesn’t, then I think the Europeans alone can’t do anything fast enough to keep Ukraine in the game. But they can certainly start spending enough to become functionally militarily independent in their ability to defend themselves from external threats, one of which, in many of their eyes, is the United States.
RA: If Trump is ideological about anything, it’s tariffs. His views have been consistent since the 1980s.
One theory about his actions: Trump understands that tariffs are disruptive and likely to hurt lower-income families more, in relative terms, because of how they proportionally spend money. So, the theory goes, Trump will accept blowback for a few months and then offer tax cuts ahead of the midterms to sway public opinion his way. But given the recent market blowback, how resistant is Trump to the short-term pain from tariffs?
IB: More than he was in his first term. He’s not running again. He wants to get things done very quickly. He has yes-men and women around him who will not push back, certainly not on tariffs or economic policies. By the end of the year, we think the American tariff environment will be the highest since the 1930s or ’40s. That will have a real market cost.
But Trump is willing to tolerate that market cost more than he has been historically. He’s already said so, acknowledging a recession might be possible and that there may be some pain. It’s significant that he is willing to break some eggs to make this omelet. And so, Trump’s ability to implement a much greater array of disruptive policies, even revolutionary policies, will really change the nature of governance in the United States. He has much more capacity to do that this term.
RA: There’s probably no one else I know who speaks to CEOs as often as you do, Ian. After the election, many of them seemed fairly bullish about Trump. They were excited about deregulation and tax cuts. And they were willing to take some pain from instability and tariffs. How are they gaming out Trump now? What are these policies doing to their businesses and supply chains? And do they have any leverage over Trump if they’re not happy?
IB: Some of them are happy, of course—particularly those that put money into the Trump campaign. He’s talking about a crypto reserve and has been very focused on deregulation in that environment. He’s been focused on deregulation for the banks, for fossil fuels, and particularly oil and gas. Online betting is certainly happy with him right now. If you gave money to Trump, generally speaking, he is performing for you. So the United States has become more kleptocratic, more pay for play as a political system. But that is not new under Trump. In fact, it was already the most kleptocratic and state-captured system by private sector special interests in the advanced industrial democracies by a long margin. Trump has sped that process up dramatically. The clear winners are those who are willing to say great things about Trump in every form. And it’s why you’ve gotten the shift for Mark Zuckerberg, most dramatically in his newfound anti-woke-ism that I think is a revealed preference.
But there are also a large number of CEOs who have paid for Trump but are not in his inner circle. And I’ve never seen such a large gap between what they say publicly and what they say privately. They are extremely concerned that they will be taken down a peg if they publicly oppose any of Trump’s policies. But they’re deeply worried about the implications of these tariffs, very worried about the chilling effect of some of the anti-immigration policies that have been floated by the administration. They’re concerned about some of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) efforts, which are more chainsaw than scalpel and which they think are hurting the U.S. companies that don’t take money from USAID. But think about all of the companies that have been contractors for USAID for many, many years. None of them were willing to stand up to the Trump administration or file lawsuits, even though many of those contracts were ripped up without due process, because they do not want to publicly invoke the ire of the Trump administration. Think about how few law firms were prepared to provide legal support for Jack Smith. Most of them said, “We don’t want to touch it because that’s a clear and extant risk to our business.”
So I’m seeing not only complicity, but fear. That is how one ends up in a McCarthyist position. It’s how you undermine rule of law in a democracy. I’ve studied states in transition my entire life; we’re seeing a lot of things that erode institutional legitimacy. Because civic engagement is important, but also the ability of elites to orient in whatever political direction they want without consequence for you or your family—a lot of elites no longer feel that way. And that’s literally over the course of 50 days. So I would say that’s pretty big. So if the biggest impact globally of Trump has been Europe, I think the biggest impact domestically has been a signaling impact on the behavior of elites—media elites, university elites, and, most importantly and powerfully, business elites.
RA: I want to underscore what you said about the United States’ history of corruption. It is one of the most kleptocratic of all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The American Dream has been receding as a possibility for many years now.
One other global dimension of this is soft power. You could argue American soft power, for reasons like Iraq, or Afghanistan, or any number of other missteps, has long been in decline. Does this moment accelerate that decline?
IB: Soft power has been in decline because I think a lot of people didn’t know what the United States stood for. Historically, the United States occasionally stood for things that were out of alignment with the very institutions that Americans created. The United Nations charter is robust on human rights and territorial integrity, but look at America’s behavior in some of the failed wars that it unilaterally engaged in. Look at the lack of transparency of the United States, the fact that the United States has decided not to be a member of the International Criminal Court. Look at Israel-Gaza. Around the world, American support is an almost uniquely isolated position. And that wasn’t a Trump policy. So, again, it’s not as if American soft power suddenly fell off a cliff because Trump became president. Trump was a symptom of this. He was a beneficiary of this.
One of the most interesting points in the election was that a majority of the people who said democracy mattered to their vote voted for Trump. And they did so because they believed that the United States was no longer really a democracy, due to the special-moneyed interests who captured the system to make it work for them without working for average Americans. So, in other words, a lot of Americans had the same view that a lot of non-Americans did, disbelieving what America says it stands for.
Now, of course, the great irony here is that Trump wants to be the great disruptor in the United States, but he also is a principal kleptocrat. So he has identified the principal symptom and communicated some essential truths about how broken the American system has become. And yet, the likelihood that he will fix it and make America once again a beacon of democracy, a beacon of human values, seems farcical. He’s actually breaking the U.S.-led global system. And again, to go back to the beginning, the principal long-term beneficiary of America First, and perhaps “America Only,” will be the Chinese.
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